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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

JAMES J.

~IILLIGAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No. 8777

CAPITOL FURNITURE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendants and Respondent.:;.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY

STATE~1:ENT

Appellant will be referred to throughout this brief
as he appeared below, namely, plaintiff. Respondent will
be referred to by name where necessary, or simply a;-;
defendant. All italics are ours.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

This appeal is from the order of the trial court entering judgment of "no cause of action" following the subInission of plaintiff's case to the jury on a special verdict.
The special verdict submitted seven questions to
the jury for their answers. The questions and answers
given were as follows:

Question I. Did the defendants maintain a downspout drainage system which was negligently constructed~

Answer:

No.

Question I I. Was the manner in which the down
spout was constructed a proximate cause of plaintiff's fall~
Answer : ------------------------

Question I I I. Did the defendants negligently
allow water from the down spout to run onto the
sidewalk and form ice?
Answer: Yes.

Question IV. \Vas such negligence a proximate
cause of plaintiff's fall?
Answer:

Yes.
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Question V. Was plaintiff negligent in walking
across the ice where he fell¥
Answer:

Yes.

Question VI. Was such negligence a proximate
cause of plaintiff's fall¥
Answer:

No.

Question VII. As shown by a preponderance of
the evidence in this case, what amount of money
would fairly and adequately recompense the plaintiff for any .and all injuries he sustained as a result of his falling on the ice as set forth in Instruction No. 15?
Answer: $5,000.00.
The Jury verdict of $5,000.00 did not take into account the special damages which were for medical and
hospital expenses. The specials amounts to $1123.00
(R. 148). The total judgment which the plaintiff would
be entitled to is, therefore, $6,123.00.
Following the return of the verdict of the Jury
plaintiff moved the Honorable Court for the entry of
Judgment on behalf of the plaintiff for $6,123.00. Defendant moved the Court for entry of judgment on behalf
of defendant "no cause of action." The matter was argued
and the Court ordered Judgment "no cause of action"
entered (H. 149-150). Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion
for t"n t r~· of judgment, or in the alternative, for a new
trial (R. 15fi-157). The rnotion was denied (R. 158).
Plaintiff then perfected his appeal.
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The evidence revealed during the trial that plaintiff
at about 4:45 P.:M:. on the 5th day of February, 1956,
while walking along on the south side of Second South
Street, at approximately 561 West, attempted to cross
over .a sheet of ice covering the sidewalk; that as he
started across the ice he fell and suffered a fracture of
the iliurn of his right leg and miscellaneous bruises and
abrasions. For several months following the injury
plaintiff wa.s completely disabled and incurred the
$1123.00 in rnedical and hospital expenses.
The ice covering the sidewalk came onto the sidewalk as result of a drain pipe from the roof of the building at 561 West 2nd South Street, being clogged and permitting the n1elted water from the roof of the building to
drain out onto the sidewalk.
The jury in the answer to Question No. 3 of the
special verdict found that the defendants negligently
allowed the water from the downspout to run onto the
sidewalk and formed the ice. They also found that this
was a proximate cau.se of plaintiff's fall.
The Rules of Civil Procedure specifically cover the
right of the Court to subn1it to a Jury special verdicts.
Rule 49 (b) covers the situation which exists when answers to interrogatories are inconsistent with the general
verdict or with each other. That portion of Rule 49 (b)
applie.able reads as follows:
"\Vhen the answers are consistent with each
other but one or more is inconsistent with the
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general verdict, the court may direct the entry
of judgment in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict or may return
the jury for further consideration of its answers
and verdict or may order a new trial. When the
an.swers .are inconsistent with each other and one
or more is likewise inconsistent with the general
verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of
judgment but may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order
a new trial."
The basic question presented by this appeal is the
proper course for the trial court to follow where the
answers of the jury reveal that a party was negligent
but that the negligence was not a proximate cause of his
injury.
STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

POINT I.
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ENTERED ON THE SPECIAL VERDICT OF THE
JURY.
POINT II.
IF THE ANSWERS TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT QUESTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED PLAINTIFF.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE REVEALS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
NOT .CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
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POINT IV.
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN SUBMITTING THE SPECIAL
VERDICT TO THE JURY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ENTERED ON THE SPECIAL VERDICT OF THE
JURY.

The Special Verdict rendered by the Jury indicates
that while there was something in the nature of negligence which plaintiff did, the Jury did not think that the
negligence was the proximate cause of his injury. Just
what the Jury had in mind .as being negligence is a matter
of pure speculation.
This Court will not be given the opportunity of seeing
plaintiff. He was a large, tall disjointed type of person
whose bodily movements were themselves such as would
suggest a looseness of action. It may be that the jury
thought that Mr. Milligan's gait, or manner of walking
was .a negligent manner of walking. Something, he alone
is afflicted with in the nature of a personal idiosyncrasy.
Whatever the Jury thought, if they followed the instructions of the Court, and it must be presumed that they did,
they did not think it caused his fall. It is respectfully
~u b1ni tted that the Court is bound by the determination
that whatever negligenre he was guilty of did not cause
his injuries.
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The law seems to be clear to the effect that in order
for negligence of a plaintiff to bar his recovery the negligence must be a proximate cause of the injury. An excellent case illustrating the law, Friedman v. Pacific Outdoor Advertising Co., 74 C. Ap. 2d 946, 170 P. 2d 67.
An additional California case, directly in point, is N elson v. Colbeck, 94 C. A. 2d 792,211 P. 2d 878.
The Inost recent Utah decision, discussing the kind
of negligence necessary to bar recovery is Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 4 U. 2d 137, 289 P. 2d 196.
This Court placed the burden on the defendant to
show not only plaintiffs negligence but that it was a
substantial factor contributing to the injury and damage
suffered. vVhether the burden has been sustained must be
left to the Jury for its determination. Stickle v. Union
Pacific Railroad Company, 122 U. 477, 251 P. 2d 867.
To the same effect is the recent case of McDonald
v. Linick, et al., ______ N. M. ______ , 265 P. 2d 132.
It is respectfully submitted that since the Jury found
that the negligence of plaintiff was not a proximate cause
of his injury judgment should have been entered for
plaintiff for the amount of damages found.

POINT IL
IF THE ANSWERS TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT QUESTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED PLAINTIFF.
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The answers to Questions 5 and 6 are not inconsistent
one with another and are not inconsistent with the general verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant
Negligence may occur which does not cause injury.
The Trial Court considered the answers to questions
5 and 6 to be inconsistent with each other. It ruled as
matter of law that the negligence found in Question No.5
was the proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff. His
ruling set aside the answer the Jury made to Question
No. 6, that the negligence was not a proximate cause.
Rule 49 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
"When the answers are inconsistent with each
other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with
the general verdict the Court shall not direct the
entry of judgment but may return the Jury for
further consideration of its answers and verdict,
or may order a new trial."
The trial court did not return the jury for further
consideration of its answers .and did not order a new trial,
but instead resolved the inconsistency in favor of the
defendant.
Assu1ning for the purpose of this argu1nent that the
answers then are inconsistent one with another. "'\Vhich
answer shall the Court accept and enter judgment upon?
It would appear obvious to plaintiff that to choose one
of the .answers and enter judgment on that answer would
be to detennine factual rnatters ·within the province of
the .Jury only.
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There is nothing about the answers which would
make the trial court's decision necessary. It is sub1nitted
that it could be equally rea,sonable for the Court to have
held that the only negligence the evidence revealed that
plaintiff could be guilty of would necessarily be a proximate cause. Therefore, the negligence found was not a
proximate cause could only mean that the Jury found
negligence not supported by evidence or negligence with
no relationship to the damage and injury which the plaintiff suffered.
It is not within the province of the trial court to decide the facts where there is substantial evidence to support a jury finding. To resolve the inconsistent answers,
if such they be, necessarily requires the trial court to
make a finding on factual matters.
The reasons behind Rule 49(b) would seem to be that
it would require the trial ocurt to pass on factual matters
where answers .are inconsistent. Therefore, the trial
court is not permitted to enter a judgment under such
circumstances but must return the jury to consider its
answers further, or order a new trial.
In the case of Welch et al. v. Bower, 186 F. 2d 1002,
the basic question was answered exactly as suggested
by plaintiff. The holding reads as follows :
" ( 3) We cannot agree, though, that defendants were entitled to a judgment on the verdict
and that the judgment should be reversed and here
rendered for them. The answer to the special
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issue is completely inconsistent with the general
verdict. This being so, this is a case in which,
under Rule 49, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 28 U.S.C.A.
the answer to the special issue being inconsistent
with the general verdict, the eourt could not enter
a judgment on it, but must either return the case
to the jury for further consideration of its answers, or grant a new trial. Since he did not return the case to the jury he should have ordered
a new trial."
Plaintiff respectfully submits that if the answers
are inconsistent and the trial court is correct in so detennining, then the only course remaining to be followed
is that the case be returned and a new trial ordered.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE REVEALS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
NOT ·CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW.

The evidence concerning the care exercised by plaintiff in proceeding along the sidewalk in an easterly direction crune only frmn hin1self and the witnesses, Louis
Johnson and Alex Geros. ~Ir. !iilligan stated as follows, concerning the condition which he observed prior
to his fall:

"Q.

What did you notice, ~Ir. :Milligan, about the
sidewalk then when you-when its condition
changed~

A.

Where I noticed the condition on the sidewalk, where the ice had piled up over the
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-there was a big steel door there. The ice
and snow w.as all up into there, and I had
taken and walked down where I thought was
a clean good walk, and just as quick as I hit
that with Iny foot, it went right out just like
that in a second bef·ore you could even think

Q.

What did you observe about the place that
you actually stepped on~ What was its condition~

A.

vVell, I thought at the time, I didn't know
it was as slick as it was underneath. I couldn ~t
see it was as slick as it was, but I thought it
was a safe place to walk.

Q.

And after you fell, did you discover something different about~

A.

Well, I found I couldn't get up. I found underneath it was just as slick as glass underneath
there. It was awfully slick.

Q.

vVhat made it

slick~

It was the water down spout I imagine was
run off there and turned real cold.
:MR. HAYES: Just moment. I object to a
conclusion of the witness as to what he imagines.
THE COURT: The objection will be sustained. You may tell us what you found, what you
saw there.

A.

A.

Oh. Ice underneath the snow on the sidewalk
was very slick, and I couldn't get up.

fl. i\lr. _i\lilligan, that ice, how far did it extend
on the

sidewalk~
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A.

I didn't measure that. I didn't measure it. I
would imagine it was over the sidewalk, but
I did not-

Q. Well, now, the word 'imagine' is a word that
is very offensive in court. Imagination has
no place. Tell us what you saw concerning
the extent of ice that covered the sidewalk
where you fell.
A.

Well, I just saw the ice and little what I
thought was a skiff of snow, and I went to go
around on the other into the center of where
the traffic looked like to me was safe, and as
I went over that, I just stepped into that, and
my foot went right out from under me, and
I would say that it was, oh, space of about
ten or twelve feet."

Witness Lewis Johnson, concerning the extent of
ice on the sidewalk, stated as follows:

"Q.

How n1uch of the sidewalk "\vas covered with
ice~

A.

\Yell, from the building out to the curb I
would say approximately eight feet wide;
could be n1ore.

Q. Did you notice anything about the front of
the building there and the down spout~
A.

Yes. It was covered with ice.

Q.

"\Vhere did the ice start on that down

A.

\Vell, it was up at the top. The front of the
building was covered with ice all down by the
spout." (p. 100)

spout~
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Witness Alex Geros stated:

"Q. And where was the

ice~

A.

Right in the drain pipe.

Q.

Around the drain

A.

Around the drain pipe.

pipe~

Q. And about how far out did it

extend~

A.

Well, I imagine-I got a stick just for fun,
yard stick. There was two sticks square.

Q.

Two feet square 1

A.

No, I don't know how far-about three feet.
I don't know how far. How long is the stick,
yard stick~ Three feet supposed to be.

Q. Yard stick.
A. Yard stick.

Q. About three feet
A.

then~

Yes, must be three feet.

Q. Now, past the end of the yard stick was there
ice, or was the sidewalk clearf
A. Clear." (p. 117)
On Page 120:

"Q.

Now, that ice that was three and a half inches
deep was right against the buildingf

A.

No, in the pipe, around the pipe.

Q.

Around the

A.

Around the pipe.

pipe~
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Q. And did the ice extend up the face of that
building, do you remember?
A.

The face, the pipe extend-

Q.

The ice, did it come up the drain pipe, up
the face of the building?

A.

Yes, like I told you, yes."

On page 122:

"Q.
A.

Can you see the iron doors there right under
your thumb? You see the iron doors there~
Yes, iron door here.

Q. When the ice colleots on the sidewalk there at
the bottom of the drain spout, it comes over
on the iron door, does it?
A.

Right here, yes.

Q. And then when it melts, does it run out across
the sidewalk, Mr. Geros, out to the curb and
off into the curb when that snow or when
that ice at the bottom of the drain pipe melts~
A.

'Yell, part i~ straight and together and part
spreads all over.

Q.

It spreads all oyer. does it, so that if there
had been a little of that water Inelt, it would
spread all over the ~idewalk and would run
off. You ~rP this crack in the edge of the
f'idrwalk there. Doesn't the water when it
frrP:t.Pf' around the bottom of the drain pipe
and then 1nelts run off and run off into tlw
g-utter about that point -

A.

rrhat is a drain

:-;('Wl'l'.
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Uj

Q.

-and across the top of the sidewalk~ Doesn't
the water when ice melts at the bottom of
the drain pipe run out across the sidewalk
and into the gutter~

A.

If it is sewer, bound to be-run street.

Q.

Well, I understand that that is Mr. Hayes'
and Mr. Richards' theory, that the pipe under
the sidewalk was blocked; but .all I am concerned about is when there is ice collected
on the sidewalk under the drain pipe and it
melts, it runs across the sidewalk and into the
gutter, doesn't it~ Isn't that a fact 1

A.

Spreads all over.

Q.

Spreads all over1

A.

Spreads."

IU!r

ml

~al

om

There was no evidence of any kind submitted to the
Jury which would be the basis for a finding that Mr.
Milligan, in observing the sidewalk, could have, as result
of his observations, a,scertain the fact that Mr. Geros
says existed. Assuming for the purpose of this argument
that Geros' testimony is correct and that both ~1:illigan
and Johnson are in error as to the amount of ice that
was on the sidewalk. A person walking on the sidewalk is
not required to see everything that could be observed.
Mr. Geros conducted an expedition to measure the ice
on the sidewalk. Milligan stated that there was a slight
skiff of snow, and that the skiff of snow appeared to hin1
to cover the whole sidewalk and that he walked on an
area where it appeared that he could safely walk.
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There is not the slightest amount of evidence contradictory to his statement. No person testified that this
appearance did not exist, or that a reasonably prudent
person walking along the same area would not likewise
have thought as he thought that he could safely walk
where he walked.
It is respectfully submitted that plaintiff was not
negligent as a Inatter of law and that there was no evidence from which the Jury could have found that he did
not exercise that degree of care which an ordinary prudent pers·on, under all the circumstances, would have
exercised.
POINT IV.
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND
ABuSED HIS DISCRETION IN SUBMITTING THE SPECIAL
VERDICT TO THE JURY.

Plaintiff objected to the Court subn1itting the case
to the .Jury on a Special Yerdict. Special Yerdict form
was not requested hy the defendant but was giYen to the
jury solely upon the Court's own responsibility.
rrhe Hta tute .a llo\Y~ special yerdicts as a Inatter of
di~erdion

on the part of the court. Abuse of this discretion would, it is respectfully subn1itted, n1erit a reY<'r~:d of the rasp now before the Court.
':Plw <'<1:->P sulnnitted to the Jury \\·as not one of a
<'OIIlpli<'atPd natun' with nu1nbers of factual propositions
to he rldenninerl whieh could not be adequately and fully
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understood by the Jury. The case is one of the kind which
is normally submitted to juries for general verdicts.
The purpose of the trial court in declining to submit
the case to the Jury on a general verdict was to restrict
the normal functions of the Jury. He intended to cut
down the realm in which the Jury historically, constitutionally and properly operates.
There has, during the past years among legal scholars, developed a very serious dispute concerning the
value of special verdicts and interrogatories as against
the use of the general verdict. Chief .among the proponents of restricting the realm in which the jury is permitted to operate is Judge Frank, one of the United
States Circuit Court Justices. He is joined in his campaign to restrict the Jury in its function by several respectable legal scholars who candidly state that they
have no confidence in the Jury System of deciding factual
matters and that as a consequence the Jury should be
restricted in its functions. They recognize the impossibility of obtaining sufficient public support to abolish
trial by jury and so seek by indirection to destroy a right
held dear by all. See Moore Federal Practice, 2nd Ed.
Vol. 5, Section 49.05, p. 2212 for a scholarly discussion
of the dispute.
Moore points out that answers to the questions such
as were propounded and submitted to the Jury by the
trial Court in the present cast throw no more light on
what the Jury found as to the facts than would the general verdict. He states:
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"Like the general verdict answers to such
questions are legal conclusions based on undisclosed facts. Furthermore, such questions might
confuse the jury and certainly would increase the
possibility of error and clerical mistake.
"The reason why it is not always feasible to
plead f.acts apply also to the formulation of questions of fact to be submitted to the jury." (p. 2217)
This Court, in a very recent case, discussed an instance of the jury's intentions and desires being defeated
by special verdicts they did not understand. See Cooper
v. Evans, 1 U 2d 68,262 P. 2d 278.
Moore concludes as follows concerning this attempt
by certain radical elements to abolish or restrict the use
of the general verdict :
"Also, the general verdict, at times, achieves
a triumph of justice over law. The Jury is not,
nor should it become, a scientific fact finding body.
Its chief value is that it applies the 'law,' oftentimes a body of technical and refined theoretical
principle.s and son1eti.J.nes edged with harshness,
in an earthy fashion that comport~ with 'justice'
as conceived bv the Inasses. for whom after all
the law is 1naii:tly Ineant to serve. The general
YPrdict i~ the answer frmn the 1nan in the street.
If on occasion the trial judge thinks the jury
should lw quizzed about its overall judgment a~
evidenef'd hy the general verdict, this can be done
hy intPrrogatories accmnpanying the general verdict. Hut if there is suffieient 12vidence to get b~
a nwtion for directed verdict, then the problem
is usually best solvPd by an ovt>rall, conunon judgInent of the jurors-the general verdict.
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"The general verdict is not simply a device
for defeating logic and the law. It is a medium
through which the people effectively express thenlselves and individually participate in their government. While the special verdict does not constitute an infringement of the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial it is .a mode of quizzing the
jury, and a means of limiting the role of juries
in the administration of justice. The general verdict is founded upon faith in the judgment of
felloWinen. Furthermore the notion that issues
of 'fact' are easily framed is unsound."
Two of the greatest scholars that American Jurisprudence has known have also, in published articles,
commented upon the drive being made to restrict and
ultimately abolish trial by jury.
"See Wigmore, A Program For the Trial of a
.Jury Trial (1929) 12 Am. Jud. Soc. 166, 170: 'Law
and Justice are from time to time inevitably in
conflict. That is because law is a general rule
(even the stated exceptions to the rules .are general exceptions) ; while justice is the fairness of
this precise case under all its circumstances. And
as a rule of law only take account of broadly typical conditions, and is aimed on average results,
law and justice every so often do not coincide.
Everybody knows this, .and can supply instances.
But the trouble is that Law cannot concede ·it.
Law-the-rule-must be enforced-the exact terms of
the rule, justice or no justice ... Now this is where
the jury comes in. The jury, in the privacy of its
retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to the
justice of the particular case. Thus the odium of
inflexible rules of law is avoided, and popular
satisfaction is preserved. . . . That is what jury

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
trial does. It supplies that flexibility of legal
rule.s which is essential to justice and popular
contentment. And that flexibility could never be
given by judge trial. The judge (as in a chancery
case) must write out his opinion, declaring the law
and the findings of fact. He c.annot in this public
record deviate one jot from those requirements.
The jury, and the secrecy of the jury room, are
the indispensable elements in popular justice.'
"See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action (1910) 44 Am. L. Rev. 12, 18: 'Jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual
administration. The will of the state at large
imposed on a reluctant community, the will of a
majority imposed on a vigorous and determined
minority, find the same obs.tacle in the local jury
that formerly confronted kings and ministers ... ~'
Frmn an exmnination of the authorities .and the
experience in the case now before this Court, it would appear that while this Court is strongly committed to the
preserTation of the jury trial and to its pron1otion in all
of its historic and constitutional range, son1e of the
trial courts are equally conunitted to the encroachn1ent
upon the constitutional right of trial by Jury to the point
where, ultin1ately~ that right will becmue weak. puny and
ineffectual.
This Court, in Stickle Y. Uniou Pacific Rail road Co.,
] 22 U. 477. :2rll P. 2d 867, dearl~~. unequivocally and in
language ·whiell eould not be rnisunderstood, reaffirmed
itH position in regards jury trial and the protection of
it in all of its .aspects:
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"In our democratic system, the people are
the repository of power whence the law is derived;
from its initiation and creation to its final appli,.
cation and enforcement, the law is the expression
of their will. The functioning of a cross-section
of the citizenry as a jury is the method by which
the people express this will in the application of
law to controversies which arise under it. Both
our constitutional and statutory provisions assure
trial by jury to citizens of this state.
"Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arrogate to themselves arbitrary and dangerous
powers by presuming to determine questions of
fact which litigants have a right to have passed
upon by juries. Part of the merit of the jury system is its s.afeguarding against such arbitrary
power in the courts. T,o the great credit of the
courts of this country, they have been extremely
reluctant to infringe upon this right, and by leaving it unimpaired have kept the administration of
justice close to the people. Of course, the rights
of litigants should not be surrendered to the arbitrary will of juries without regard to whether
there is a violation of legal rights as ,a basis for
recovery. The Court does have a duty and a responsibility of supervisory control over the action
of juries which is just as essential to the proper
administration of justice as the function of the
jury itself. Nevertheless, we remain cognizant of
the vital importance of the privilege of trial h~r
jury in our system of justice and deem it our duty
to zealously protect and preserve it."

It is respectfully submitted that this type of legal
action is not one which is susceptible to the use of special
verdicts or special interrogatories. That the obvious
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purpose of the trial court without request by any party
and over the protest of plaintiff in submitting special
verdicts was to restrict the constitutional right of the
plaintiff to a trial by jury. If this court approves the
trial court's conduct in this respect, further inroads on
the constitutional rights of the citizens of the State of
Utah will be inevitable. Eventually the right of trial by
jury will be eroded away until it will be insignificant,
unimportant and may vanish completely. If the jury
trials are to be .abolished, certainly it should be directly,
openly, honestly and fairly, and not by indirection and
erosion.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully .submitted that this Court should:
Order the trial court to enter judgment in favor
of plaintiff and against the defendant £,or the sum of
$6,123.00 or,
1.

2. If it is determined that the answers to questions
3 and 4 are inconsistent that the case be returned for a
new trial.
Respeetfull~-

KTKO

subn1itted,
~\~D

HUGHES

By: ] hVIGHT L. KiNG
Attonzcys .for Plaintiff' and
Appellant.
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